In De Veritate, question 12, article 3, Thomas Aquinas discusses whether prophecy is natural. Given that there he argues that prophecy is a divine gift , he seems to break away from the Muslim philosopher Avicenna, who holds a naturalistic explanation of this phenomenon. Certainly Avicenna explained prophecy in psychological and metaphysical terms, and was considered by some Christian theologians as proponent of a naturalistic view, thought to be incompatible with prophecy conceived as a divine and supernatural gift. In this (...) paper I trace the origin of the discussion on whether prophecy is natural or supernatural, and then I recapitulate Avicenna’s understanding of this phenomenon in two short treatises, namely, the Epistle Concerning Dreams and On the Proof of Prophecies, and in the De anima and the Metaphysics of his major work The Book of Healing. Then I review Aquinas’s understanding of Avicenna’s view and his own conception of “natural prophecy” in order to show that, although when he argues for the divine origin of prophecy he distances himself from the Persian philosopher, he sees in his interpretation of Avicenna’s naturalistic doctrine a theory that could explain why some people sometimes attain knowledge of future events through a natural process different from divine prophecy. Finally, I discuss for what purpose Aquinas would have admitted this naturalistic view. (shrink)

This valuable reference work synthesizes and elucidates traditional themes and issues in Islamic philosophy as well as prominent topics emerging from the last twenty years of scholarship. Written for a wide readership of students and scholars, The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy is unique in including coverage of both perennial philosophical issues in an Islamic context and also distinct concerns that emerge from Islamic religious thought. This work constitutes a substantial affirmation that Islamic philosophy is an integral part of the (...) Western philosophical tradition. Featuring 33 chapters, divided into seven thematic sections, this volume explores the major areas of philosophy: Logic, Metaphysics, Philosophy in the Sciences, Philosophy of Mind/Epistemology, and Ethics/Politics as well as philosophical issues salient in Islamic revelation, theology, prophecy, and mysticism. Other features include: •A focus on both the classical and post-classical periods •A contributing body that includes both widely respected scholars from around the world and a handful of the very best younger scholars •"Reference" and "Further Reading" sections for each chapter and a comprehensive index for the whole volume The result is a work that captures Islamic philosophy as philosophy. In this way it serves students and scholars of philosophy and religious studies and at the same time provides valuable essays relevant to the study of Islamic thought and theology. (shrink)

Se discute cómo pueden dos filósofos islámicos sostener que la generación del cuerpo es necesaria para que se origine el alma y, al mismo tiempo, afirmar que ésta puede separarse del cuerpo, ya sea transformándose en un intelecto inmaterial ‒en el caso de al-Fārābī‒, o bien en un alma individuada e inmortal ‒en el caso de Avicena. El primero es cercano al hilemorfismo peripatético; el segundo adopta un dualismo robusto. Se argumenta que la integración de la cosmología, la biología y (...) la noética conduce, en ambos casos, a una reconciliación coherente entre el origen natural del alma y su inmaterialidad. (shrink)

En varios pasajes de sus obras psicológicas, Avicena sugiere que los animales no humanos tienen un yo. Aquí argumentaré que, a partir de las características que le atribuye a la percepción, hay razones de peso para sospechar que los animales no humanos efectivamente tienen un yo: el impulso natural en ellos hacia la supervivencia, la familiaridad con su propio cuerpo, su capacidad para tender hacia aquello que les resulta conveniente y huir de lo peligroso de acuerdo con sus propias circunstancias, (...) así como el modo de relacionarse con el mundo, son conductas que, como se verá, requerirían la presencia de un yo. In several passages from his psychological works Avicenna suggests that non-human animals have a self. Here I argue that from the Avicennian description of perception, there are strong reasons to suspect that non-human animals have a self: their natural self-preservation impulse, the familiarity they have with their own body, their capacity to move towards what they perceive as convenient and to avoid what is dangerous according to their own circumstances, and the way each one relates to the world, are behaviors that, as will be shown, would require the presence of a self. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Averroes on Intellect: From Aristotelian Origins to Aquinas’s Critique by Stephen R. OgdenLuis Xavier López-FarjeatStephen R. Ogden. Averroes on Intellect: From Aristotelian Origins to Aquinas’s Critique. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. 296. Hardback, $90.00.Stephen Ogden’s book is a remarkable contribution to one of the most controversial topics within the tradition of interpreters of Aristotle’s De anima. As is well known, Aristotle defines the intellect (nous) as “the (...) part of the soul by which it knows and thinks” (DA III.4, 429a9– 10). This doctrine of the intellect becomes rather obscure in DA III.5, where Aristotle states that there is a passive intellect that needs to be actualized through an active intellect. This passage contains, perhaps, the most debated statement in Aristotelian psychology. Aristotle argues that the passive or potential intellect is the part of the soul that, in a sense, becomes all things as it knows them. The intellect, however, has another aspect: in a sense, it makes all things. This is what Aristotle calls the “active” or “agent” intellect. This characterization is fairly ambiguous: it is separable (chôristos), separated (chôristheis), not passive (apathês), unmixed (amigês), and it is essentially an activity (têi ousiai energeia); furthermore, it is immortal (athanaton), eternal (aidion), and always thinking.According to Alexander of Aphrodisias’s interpretation, Aristotle holds that since the human intellect is in potency, its actualization needs the intervention of an intellect that is always thinking, namely, the active intellect. Alexander associates the active or agent intellect (poiêtikos nous) with the divine intellect and divine intellection as it appears in Aristotle’s Metaphysics XII.9, 1074b33–35, another famous passage where Aristotle describes the first mover as thought thinking itself. A long tradition of interpreters and commentators, both ancient and medieval, discussed whether Aristotle held that the actualization of the potential intellect came from an external intellect—be it God (as Alexander thought) or another kind of separate intellect (as was the case for Islamic philosophers such as al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes), or whether Aristotle was referring to two aspects within a single human intellect (as Thomas Aquinas held, for instance).As its title indicates, Ogden’s book focuses on Averroes, a Muslim philosopher who proposed one of the most puzzling interpretations of the Aristotelian doctrine of the intellect. It is puzzling, perhaps false, and even absurd, because it holds that “the intellect that understands intelligible concepts is a single, separate, eternal substance shared by [End Page 659] all humanity”(1). Strange as it may seem, this position—which Ogden calls the “unicity thesis” (1)—was among the most debated in the Jewish and Christian traditions throughout the medieval period and the Renaissance. But beyond detailing the mere reception and historical assimilation of Averroes’s doctrine, Ogden takes on the task of arguing for its philosophical coherence. It is not a simple task. One might think that, rather than helping to clarify Aristotle’s theory, Averroes made it more complicated. If it is already difficult to understand the Aristotelian definition of the active intellect and to decide whether it is a separate intellect or part of the soul, Averroes seems to make things worse by arguing that the active or agent intellect (in Latin, intellectus agens or intelligentia agens; in Arabic, ‘aql al-fa“āl) and the so-called material or possible intellect (intellectus materialis; ‘aql hayūlānī) are both single, separate, and eternal intellects.As is well known, and as Ogden himself explains, Thomas Aquinas criticized the idea of two separate intellects (passive and active) and provided an account that is in principle satisfactory, according to which the two intellects are intellectual powers of each person’s soul. There is an enormous amount of scholarly literature evaluating the merits of Thomas Aquinas’s refutation of Averroes and his followers. But as Ogden notices, few scholars— among them, Richard C. Taylor, Jean-Baptiste Brenet, Deborah Black, and Josep Puig—have pointed out that the two philosophers begin their discussions with different assumptions. In my view, one of the greatest merits of Ogden’s book is that, as far as I... (shrink)

The aim of this article is to revisit Clement of Alexandria’s Paedagogus 2.5.45-8 discussing whether Clement holds a moderate position οf laughter or, like most early Christians, tends to an “antigelastic” position. Some scholars, such as Stephen Halliwell and Laura Rizzerio, have concluded that Clement holds an intermediate position between an optimistic approach to laughter and its condemnation. However, in this essay we argue that while Clement’s position is not a straightforward antigelastic one, his apparent acceptance of laughter is so (...) narrow that his moderate view ends up being compromised. Ultimately, he is strongly inclined to condemn laughter and to prescribe an ascetic life devoid of laughter. (shrink)

La noción de Witz tiene su origen en Shafiesbury y, posteriormente, en Kant y en Fichte. El genio es el puente de unión entre la aparente contradicción de la naturaleza con la libertad y, gracias a esta importante función es el único que logra conciliar la armonía helénica con la desarmonía romántica. Desde este planteamiento el autor intenta mostrar: primero, la configuración del genio desde las nociones de naturaleza y libertad (Kant); segundo, la posible conciliación efectuada por el genio entre (...) el espíritu helénico y el espíritu romántico, que no es otra cosa que la esencia de la poesía moderna (Schlegel, Goethe); tercero, una conciliación aparente que culmina, más bien, con la frustración y el desengaño del genio, que se vuelve, según la terminología hegeliana, "conciencia infeliz" (Hegel). (shrink)

The Arabic tradition knew Alexander’s treatises On Fate and On Providence. Alexander criticizes the Stoic determinism with some peripatetic arguments. In those treatises we can find, at least, two positions: the peripatetic and “libertarian” position represented by Alexander, and Stoic determinism. A very similar discussion can be found in Islamic tradition. As S. Van den Bergh has insisted, Islamic theological schools had some Stoic influences. One of the issues in which we can find some common views is, precisely, the problem (...) of determinism and free will. The aim of this paper is to show that the kasb (acquisition)doctrine of the Islamic theologians Asharites is very similar to Stoic determinism in its compatibilist version: both, Stoics and Asharites, conceive a causal network established by the fate or the providence. From this point of view we have to discuss which is the true agent of the natural and human acts that happen in this world. If the providence guides every act, the natural causality and the free will should be denied. On the one hand, I will present some arguments from the most representative Asharite theologian, al-Ghazali, to support a kind of compatibilist determinism; from the other hand, I will evaluate Averroes peripatetic arguments against determinism. Is Averroes more consistent than Alexander or do we have to conclude that al-Ghazali and the Asharites have stronger arguments in order to support the kasb doctrine? (shrink)

Esta introducción explica el impacto que las tradiciones judía e islámica tuvieron en la fi losofía medieval, así como el intercambio intelectual que existió entre las tradiciones abrahámicas. El papel de la tradición islámica fue particularmente importante, ya que las teorías e ideas fi losófi - cas de pensadores como Avicena, Averroes, Avempace, y otros, fueron discutidas y con frecuencia reinterpretadas, adaptadas y adoptadas por muchos teólogos y fi lósofos cristianos y judíos, quienes recurrieron a ellas para utilizarlas de distintas (...) formas y en discusiones diversas, tal como se muestra en la presentación de cada uno de los artículos que conforman este volumen. (shrink)

This article exposes some characteristics of the first Arab interpretations on Aristotle´s Poetics. The thought of Abu Bishr Matta, al-Kindī and Alfarabi, philosophers previous to Avicenna, shows us that the Arabs included the Poetics as a logical treatise, but also they understand it throug..

La propuesta sobre el objetivo supremo del ser humano ofrecida por Avempache —filósofo y comentador aristotélico—, consiste en la unión absoluta de ambos: el intelecto-alma del sujeto y el intelecto agente, éste caracterizado por ser uno, separado, eterno, además de que contiene en sí las formas espirituales universales de todas las cosas. Por esta razón la inmaterialidad del alma así como su inmortalidad están garantizadas, debido a la absoluta espiritualidad del intelecto. Es por la corrupción dada en las sociedades y (...) prácticas políticas que el objetivo final es alcanzado mediante la mejor manera de vivir, la cual consiste en soledad y reflexión; sólo de esta manera se adquiere la más alta perfección. Después de comprender la relevancia que Avempache asigna al intelecto agente, Alberto Magno negó la posibilidad de la unión con el intelecto mencionado, debido a la abolición de toda pluralidad así como la disolución de toda individualidad. (shrink)

In Albert’s De anima III, 3, chapters 6–11 there is a discussion on whether the human intellect is able to apprehend only forms abstracted from matter or whether it is possible for it to know something separated from magnitude. If the human intellect is able to understand separate forms, this would mean that some forms are not apprehended with phantasms and magnitude but by the conjunction of the possible intellect and the separate intellect. This matter is quite problematic since it (...) is not clear enough whether separate forms are known through the perfect conjunction of the possible intellect and the agent intellect or by means of the agent intellect which acts both as efficient and formal cause of these forms. Here, I focus on chapter 8 where Albert criticizes Avempace’s doctrine of the intellect, and chapter 11 where he states a resolution to the problem, which is very close to that of Averroes. This exploration illustrates the complexity of the relationship between the philosophies of Albert and Averroes. (shrink)

Resumen: En De interpretatione Aristóteles distingue entre voces articuladas e inarticuladas. Mientras que la voz articulada se compone de una combinación de vocales y consonantes, la voz inarticulada equivale a cualquier sonido emitido por animales no humanos. Sin embargo, al-Fārābī cuestiona esta visión. En su Gran Comentario a De Interpretatione, corrige la postura de Aristóteles y desarrolla una argumentación que toma en cuenta algunas consideraciones sobre el comportamiento de los animales no humanos en algunos de los tratados de Aristóteles sobre (...) los animales. Tras presentar la postura de al-Fārābī en torno al "lenguaje" en los animales no humanos, discuto brevemente hasta qué punto las capacidades de los animales no humanos para expresarse y comunicarse amplían nuestra comprensión de lo que podríamos entender por lenguaje.: In De Interpretatione Aristotle distinguishes between articulate and inarticulate voices. While articulate voices are a combination of vowels and consonants, inarticulate voices would be any sound uttered by non-human animals. Nevertheless, al-Fārābī debated this view. In his Long Commentary on the De Interpretatione, he amends Aristotle's position and develops an argumentation that takes into account some considerations regarding nonhuman animals' behavior found in Aristotle's treatises on animals. After presenting al-Fārābī's views concerning the "language" of non-human animals, I briefly discuss to what extent the capacities of non-human animals to express and communicate themselves broadens our comprehension of what we might understand by language. (shrink)

El autor ofrece una interpretación hegeliana de Metafísica XII, 7, 1072b 18-30, pasaje con el que concluye la Enciclopedia de las Ciencias Filosóficas. Se trazan aquí las relaciones y similitudes que existen entre el Motor Inmóvil de Aristóteles y el Absoluto de Hegel. Para comprender en qué puntos coinciden ambos pensadores al describir el pensamiento divino, resulta de suma importancia analizar las nociones de pensamiento, movimiento, potencia, acto, concepto, objeto, sustancia material, sustancia formal y sustancia suprasensible. El giro interpretativo que (...) hace Hegel de la Metafísica y la lectura comparada que aquí se ofrece, apuntan hacia una mejor comprensión de la naturaleza del Motor Inmóvil y el Absoluto. (shrink)

This thematic introduction to classical Islamic philosophy focuses on the most prevalent philosophical debates of the medieval Islamic world and their importance within the history of philosophy. Approaching the topics in a comprehensive and accessible way in this new volume, Luis Xavier Lopez-Farjeat, one of the co-editors of The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy, makes classical Islamic philosophy approachable for both the new and returning student of the history of philosophy, medieval philosophy, the history of ideas, classical Islamic intellectual history, (...) and the history of religion. Providing readers with a complete view of the most hotly contested debates in the Islamic philosophical tradition, Lopez-Farjeat discusses the development of theology and philosophy during the ʿAbbāsid period, including the translation of Aristotle into Arabic, the philosophy and theology of Islamic revelation, logic and philosophy of language, philosophy of natural science, metaphysics, psychology and cognition, and ethics and political philosophy. This volume serves as an indispensable tool for teachers, students, and independent learners aiming to discover the philosophical problems and ideas that defined the classical Islamic world. Key Features - Offers readers a broad, thorough view of the history of Islamic philosophy by using a thematic approach. - Traces the dialogues between philosophers and theologians about important and controversial topics. - Offers both historical descriptions of the key debates in classical Islamic philosophy and current interpretations by contemporary scholars. - Includes extensive lists for further reading at the end of each chapter, directing curious students to the best avenues for further research. (shrink)

The Epistle concerning Dreams is a little known work where Avicenna deals with some relevant considerations regarding the way in which prophecy and veridical dreams take place. The theory contained in this- treatise accurately illustrates how intricate Avicenna’s theory of prophecy is and, at the same time, provides several clues in order to recognize the origin of this theory as it appears in major treatises such as fī al-Nafs and Ilahiyat of the Šifa’. The Risala al-Manamiyya also enables us to (...) recognize the impact of several influences coming from the Ancient Greek tradition—mainly from Aristotle, Galen, Plotinus, and other Neoplatonics. This article explains the theories of divination by means of dreams and the conception of prophecy, as they appear in the Arabic version of the De divinatione per somnum, a treatise where the origins of Avicenna’s theory of prophecy can be found. Furthermore it shows the impact that the theory contained in this treatise had in the Risala al-Manamiyya. Finally, it expounds some remarks regarding the transmission and adaptation of the metaphysical and psychological points of view posed both in the Arabic version of the De divinatione and the Risāla al-Manāmiyya, alluding to the impact they had in the theories of prophecy found both in Avicenna’s major treatises in the Šifā’. (shrink)

El presente número de Tópicos se ha dedicado al intercambio cultural y filosófico entre árabes y latinos. Los artículos que aquí se reúnen pretenden introducir al lector a la filosofía árabe-islámica en la que destacan no sólo la traducción y glosa de Aristóteles sino también una filosofía verdaderamente propia. Algunos de los artículos que aquí se ofrecen tratan sobre lo que los árabes-islámicos entendían por filosofía; otros, sobre la psicología de Averroes, Avempache, y Al Farabi, entre otros, fuertemente influenciada por (...) el estudio crítico del De Anima. (shrink)

In In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, aa. 1-3 Thomas Aquinas deals with divine simplicity and the predication of the divine attributes. There, he seems to take some distance from Avicenna, specifically when Avicenna avers that God lacks a quiddity. However, in the Summa theologiae Aquinas assumes, as he previously does both in In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1 and in De ente et essentia, that there is an identity between the essentia/quiddity and the esse in (...) God, while this statement would also be held by Avicenna. I will show how back to the Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas has detected the existing tension between the two thesis held by Avicenna, and I will also analyze the way in which he addresses both these theses. (shrink)

El autor trata de explicar la influencia del Aufklarung en las sociedades multiculurales. Explora las éticas alternativas en las estructuras sociales modernas y busca una respuesta pragmática para sostener los derechos humanos. Posteriormente, elabora una discusión breve en este sentido.